The Philosophy of Mind (104)

Trinity Term 2022

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Course Description

The purpose of this subject is to enable you to examine a variety of questions about the

nature of persons and their psychological states, including such general questions as:

what is the relation between persons and their minds? Could robots or automata be

persons? What is the relation between our minds and our brains? If we understood

everything about the brain, would we understand everything about consciousness and

rational thought? If not, why not? Several of these issues focus on the relation between

our common sense understanding of ourselves and others, and the view of the mind

developed in scientific psychology and neuroscience. Are the two accounts compatible?

Should one be regarded as better than the other? Should our common sense

understanding of the mind be jettisoned in favour of the scientific picture? Or does the

latter leave out something essential to a proper understanding of ourselves and others?

Other more specific questions concern memory, thought, belief, emotion, perception,

and action. (From the *Course Handbook*)

**General Introductions**

\*Bayne, T. 2021: *Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.

Churchland, P.M. 1984: *Matter and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

\*Crane, T. 2001: *Elements of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Heil, J. 2004: *Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction* (2nd ed). London: Routledge.

Kenny, A. 1992: *The Metaphysics of Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.

\*Kim, J. 2006. *The Philosophy of Mind* (2nd ed.) Cambridge, MA: Westview.

Mandik, P. 2014: *This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction*. Wiley Blackwell.

\*McGinn, C. 1996: *The Character of Mind (2nd ed.)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Useful Collections of Essays**

(There is often overlap between these)

Chalmers, D. (ed.) 2002: *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readi*ngs. OUP. [Hereafter Chalmers]

Block, N. (ed.) 1980: *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Volume 1.* Harvard. [Hereafter Block]

Block, N., Flanagan, O. & Güzeldere, G. 1997: *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Hereafter Block et al]

Heil, J. 2003: *Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Hereafter Heil]

McLaughlin, B. & Cohen, J. (eds.) 2007: *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Blackwell. [Hereafter McLaughlin and Cohen]

McLaughlin, B. et al. (eds.) 2009: *The Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Hereafter McLaughlin et al]

Rosenthal, D. (ed.) 1991: *The Nature of Mind.* OUP. [Hereafter Rosenthal]

Tutorial Readings Lists

**Tutorial Structure**

1. Each week you will be asked to write a brief essay on a specified question.
2. You must email the completed essay to me and to your tutorial partner (if applicable) by **Noon the day before** your tutorial.
3. I will provide written marks and feedback on your essay.
4. If you are unable to complete your essay on time or unable to attend tutorial, please notify me as soon as possible. Please arrive to tutorials on time.
5. In addition to the readings listed here, you should also look at the extensive Faculty reading list.

Week 1: Mind-Brain identity

**Question**: What is ‘type-identity’ theory? Is it a plausible?

***Primary Reading***

1. Smart, J.J.C., 1959: ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, *Philosophical Review*, 68: 141–156. In Chalmers.
2. Kim, J. 2010: *The Philosophy of Mind*, chs.1-3, 5.

***Additional Reading***

1. Bealer, G. 1994: ‘Mental Properties’, *The Journal of Philosophy* 91: 185-208.
2. Churchland, P. 1981: 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' in Chalmers.
3. Enç, B. 1983: ‘In Defense of the Identity Theory’, *Journal of Philosophy*, 80: 279-298.
4. Foster, J. 1991: *The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind* Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. ch. 4.
5. Kripke, S. 1980: *Naming and Necessity*, Lecture 3. London: Blackwell, pages 144-155 in Chalmers.
6. Lewis, D.1966: ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’ *The Journal of Philosophy* (63): pp. 17-25.
7. Place, U. T. 1956: ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, *British Journal of Psychology* in Chalmers.
8. Putnam, H. 1967: ‘The Nature of Mental States’ in his *Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers vol. 2*, in Chalmers and others.
9. Putnam, H. 1963: ‘Brains and Behaviour’, in his Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers vol. 2.
10. Ryle, G. 1949: *The Concept of Mind*, ch.1. Reprinted as ‘Descartes’ Myth’ in Chalmers

Week 2: Functionalism

**Question**: Is it possible for two creatures to be identical with respect to their functional states but nevertheless be in different phenomenal states?

***Primary Reading***

1. Armstrong, D.: 'The Causal Theory of the Mind', in Chalmers.
2. Block, N: 'Troubles with Functionalism', in his *Readings in Philosophy of Psychology*. Vol. 1. Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers.
3. Lewis, D: 1980: ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’ in his *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. I. reprinted in Block.

***Additional Reading***

1. Child, T.W. 1996: *Causality, Interpretation and the Mind*, ch. 2.
2. Foster, J. 1991: *The Immaterial Self*. London: Routledge, ch. 3.
3. Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. & Prior, E. 1982: ‘Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories’, *Philosophical Studies*, 4: 209-225.
4. Levin, J. ‘Functionalism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/
5. Lewis, D.: 1994: 'Reduction of Mind', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*. London: Blackwell.
6. Lewis, D.1972: 'Psycho-physical and Theoretical Identifications', in Chalmers.
7. Putnam, H 1967: 'The Nature of Mental States'*,* in Chalmers.
8. Schwitzgebel, E. 2015: ‘If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious’ *Philosophical Studies* 172: 1697–1721.
9. Shoemaker, S. 1975: ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, *Philosophical Studies* 27: 291-315; reprinted in his *Identity, Cause and Mind.*
10. Shoemaker, S. 1981: ‘Some Varieties of Functionalism’, *Philosophical Topics* 12: 83-118; reprinted in his *Identity, Cause and Mind.*

Week 3: The Mark of the Mental

**Question**: What, if anything, is the mark of the mental?

***Primary Reading***

1. Bayne, T. 2021: *Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction*. Routledge. Ch. 1
2. Crane, T. 2001: *Elements of Mind*. OUP. Ch. 1.
3. Rorty, R. 1979: *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton. Ch. 1

***Additional Reading***

1. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1965: ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, in R. Butler (ed) *Analytic Philosophy*.
2. Brentano, F. 1874. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. London: Routledge.
3. Crane, T. 1998: ‘Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental’
4. Dennett, D. 1971: ‘Intentional Systems’ *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (4)
5. Dretske, F. 2002: ‘A Recipe for Thought’, in D. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.
6. Freud, S. 1915: ‘The Unconscious’ in P. Gay (ed) The Freud Reader. Norton
7. Prior, A. N. 1971: *Objects of Thought*. OUP. Ch. 8
8. Sainsbury, R. M. 2018: *Thinking about Things.* OUP. Ch. 1

Week 4: Consciousness

**Question**: When Mary is let out of her black and white room, does she gain some ‘phenomenal information’?

***Primary Reading***

1. Jackson, F. 1982: 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', in Chalmers.
2. Lewis, D. 1988: 'What Experience Teaches', in Chalmers.

***Additional reading***

1. Balog, K. 2009: ‘Phenomenal Concepts’. In McLaughlin et al.
2. Block, N. 1995: 'On a Confusion about the Concept of Consciousness', *Brain and Behavioural Sciences,* 18:227—247. Excerpts reprinted in Chalmers.
3. Block, N. 1990. “Inverted Earth,” Philosophical Perspectives, 4, J. Tomberlin, ed., Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company Byrne, A. 2020
4. Block, N. 1980: ‘Are Absent Qualia Impossible?’ *Philosophical Review*, 89: 257-74.
5. Block, N. and Stalnaker, R. 1999: ‘Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap’, *Philosophical Review*, 108: 1-46.
6. Burge, T. 1997: ‘Two Kinds of Consciousness’. In N. Block et al. (eds.).
7. Chalmers, D. 1996: *The Conscious Mind*. Oxford: OUP.
8. Chalmers, D. 2006: ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap’. In Alter, T. & S. Walter (eds), *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*. Oxford: OUP.
9. Dennett, D. 1980: 'Quining Qualia', in Chalmers.
10. Hill, C. 1997: ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem’ *Philosophical Studies* 87 (1): 61-85.
11. Hurley, S. 1998. *Consciousness in Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
12. Loar, B. 1990: 'Phenomenal States', *Philosophical Perspectives* 4:81-108. In Chalmers.
13. Martin, M. G. F. 1998. ‘Setting Things Before the Mind’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 43, 157-179.
14. Nagel, T. 1974: 'What it is Like to Be a Bat?' in Chalmers.
15. Papineau, D. 2006: ‘Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts’, In Alter, T. & S. Walter (eds), *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*. Oxford: OUP.
16. Sturgeon, S. 1994: ‘The Epistemic Basis of Subjectivity’, *Journal of Philosophy*, 91: 221-35.

Week 5: Self-Knowledge

**Question**: What is the best way to explain first-person authority?

***Primary Reading***

1. Heal, J. 2001: 'On First-Person Authority', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 102: 1-21.
2. Finkelstein, D 2003: *Expression and the Inner*, ch. 1.
3. Ryle, G. 1949: *The Concept of Mind*, ch. 6. London: Penguin Books.

***Additional Reading***

1. Bar-On, D. 2004: *Speaking My Mind.* OUP.
2. Boyle, M. 2009: 'Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
3. Byrne, A. 1995: 'Introspection', *Philosophical Topics,* 33: 79-103
4. Davidson, D. (1984). ‘First person authority’. *Dialectica, 101-111.*
5. Evans, G. 1982: *The Varieties of Reference*, ch.7.
6. Fernandez, J. 2013, *Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Fricker, E. 1998: ‘Self-knowledge: special access versus artefact of grammar- a dichotomy rejected’, In Wright et al. (eds.) *Knowing Our Own Minds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Lawlor, K. 2009: ‘Knowing What One Wants’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 79: 47-75.
9. Martin, M.G.F. 1998: ‘An Eye Directed Outwards’, in C. Wright et. al., *Knowing Our Own Minds*
10. Moran, R.: 2001: *Authority and Estrangement.* Princeton.
11. Parrott, M. 2015: ‘Expressing First-Person Authority’, *Philosophical Studies* 172 (8):2215-2237.
12. Parrott, M. 2017: ‘Self-Blindness and Self-Knowledge’,*Philosophers Imprint* (17)
13. Peacocke, C. 1998: ‘Conscious Attitudes and Self-Knowledge’, in Wright et. al. *Knowing Our Own Minds*.
14. C. Wright: 'Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy', in C. Wright, et. al., (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: OUP.
15. Schwitzgebel, E. ‘The Unreliability of Naive Introspection’ *Philosophical Review*, 117: 245-273.
16. Shoemaker, S. 1994: ‘Self-Knowledge and 'Inner Sense';, in his *The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
17. Soteriou, M. 2013: *The Mind’s Construction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chs. 13 and 15.

Week 6: Our Knowledge of Other Minds

**Question**: How do we acquire knowledge of another person’s thoughts and feelings?

***Primary Reading***

1. Dretske, F. 1973:: 'Perception and Other Minds', *Nous* 7: 33-44.
2. Gomes, A. 2015: 'Testimony and Other Minds', *Erkenntnis* 80: 173-183
3. McDowell, J 1982: 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge', in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), *Perceptual Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

***Additional Reading***

1. Avramides, A. and Parrott, M. (eds.) 2019: *Knowing Other Minds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Austin, J. L. 1946: 'Other Minds', *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 20: 122-197.
3. Avramides, A 2009.: 'Other Minds', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Cassam, Q: 2007. *The Possibility of Knowledge*, Chapter 5. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Green, M. 2010: ‘Perceiving Emotions’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*.
6. Hyslop A. and Jackson F. 1972: ‘The Analogical Inference to Other Minds’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 9: 168–176.
7. McGinn, C. 1984: ‘What is the Problem of Other Minds?’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 58: 119-37.
8. McNeill, W. 2012: ‘On Seeing That Someone is Angry’, *European Journal of Philosophy*
9. Parrott, M. 2017: ‘The Look of Another Mind’, *Mind* 126 (504):1023-1061
10. Smith, J. 2015: 'The Phenomenology of Face-to-face Mindreading', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 90 (2):274-293.
11. Pargetter R. 1984: 'The Scientific Inference to Other Minds', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 62.
12. Russell, B. 1948: 'Analogy' in Rosenthal.
13. Sober, E. 2000: ‘Evolution and the Problem of Other Minds’, *Journal of Philosophy*, 97: 365-387.

Week 7: Self-Deception

**Question**: Does someone who is self-deceived hold contradictory beliefs?

***Primary Reading***

1. Davidson, D. 1982: ‘Paradoxes of Irrationality’ in his *Problems of Rationality*
2. Johnston, M., 1988, “Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind,” in *Perspectives on Self-Deception*, B. McLaughlin and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press.

***Additional Reading***

1. Demos, R., 1960, “Lying to Oneself,” *Journal of Philosophy*, 57: 588–95.
2. Davidson, D. 1985. ‘Deception and Division’ in his *Paradoxes of Irrationality,* OUP
3. Fernández, J., 2013, “Self-deception and self-knowledge,” *Philosophical Studies* 162(2): 379–400.
4. Funkhouser, E., 2009, “Self-Deception and the Limits of Folk Psychology,” *Social Theory and Practice*, 35(1): 1–13.
5. Gendler, T. S., 2007, “Self-Deception as Pretense,” *Philosophical Perspectives*, 21: 231–258.
6. Holton, R., 2001, “What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 101(1): 53–69.
7. Mele, A., 2001, *Self-Deception Unmasked*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8. Mele, A. 1999: “Twisted Self-Deception,” *Philosophical Psychology*, 12: 117–137.
9. Mele, A. 1997: “Real Self-Deception,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 20: 91–102.
10. Nelkin, D. 2002, “Self-Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 83: 384–406.
11. Noordhoff, P. 2003, “Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 67: 75–100.

Week 8: Action and The Explanation of Action

**Question**: Are intentional actions caused by reasons, or are they caused by some other type of mental state?

***Primary Reading***

1. Davidson, D. ‘Actions, Reasons, Causes’, in his *Essays on Actions and Events*.
2. Hornsby, J. 1993: Agency and Causal Explanation’, in Heil & Mele (eds.) Mental Causation.
3. Setiya, K. 2003: ‘Explaining Action’, *Philosophical Review*, 112: 339-93.

***Additional Reading***

1. Alvarez, M. 2010: *Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Alvarez, M. and Hyman, J. 1998: ‘Agents and their actions’. *Philosophy* 73, 219–245.
3. Bach, K. 1980: ‘Actions are not Events’, *Mind* 89: 114-20
4. Bratman, M. 1987: *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reasoning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
5. Hornsby, J. 1980: *Actions*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
6. Holton, R. 2009, *Willing, Wanting, Waiting*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Lavin, D. 2012: ‘Must there be Basic Action?’ *Nous* 47: 273–301.
8. Marušić, B., & Schwenkler, J. 2018. Intending is believing: A defense of strong cognitivism. *Analytic philosophy*, *59*(3), 309-340.
9. Mele, A. 1992: *The Springs of Action*. New York: Oxford University Press.
10. O’Shaughnessy, B. 1980: *The Will* (2 volumes), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Paul, S., 2009, ‘How We Know What We’re Doing,’ *Philosophers’ Imprint*, 9
12. Schwenkler, J. 2015, ‘Understanding “Practical Knowledge,”’ *Philosophers’ Imprint*, 15
13. Shepherd, J. 2021, *The Shape of Agency*, Oxford University Press
14. Tanney, J. 1995: ‘Why Reasons May Not Be Causes’, *Mind and Language*, 10: 103–26.
15. Tanney, J. 2009: Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations’, in Sandis (ed.) New Essays on the Explanation of Action.
16. Velleman, D. 1992: ‘What Happens When Someone Acts?’ *Mind* 101: 461-481.