

**PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY I
(6AANA024) FALL 2016**

Credits: 15 units

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Consultation Hours: Tuesday 2-3 pm; Wednesday 12-1 pm, and by appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course will explore philosophical issues arising from areas of contemporary research in psychology and cognitive science. In the first part of the course, we consider a number of foundational questions. What is the nature of psychological explanation? In what sense, if any, do psychological processes involve representations? How do explanations in terms of neurons relate to folk psychological explanations? We will discuss the extremely influential computational theory of mind, as well as some alternative theoretical frameworks. In the second part of the course, we will explore philosophical questions that are raised by specific topics in contemporary psychological research.

READING

The readings for the course are separated into the following categories:

Core Reading: reading that everyone who wants proper coverage of the subject must read.

Recommended Reading: readings that are strongly recommended to help you further develop your views on a particular subject.

Additional Reading: useful background readings for anyone interested in further exploring a topic.

The following are good introductory texts for anyone seeking background knowledge:

A. Clark: *MindWare*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

T. Crane: *The Elements of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

K. Sterelny: *The Representational Mind*. Wiley: Blackwell.

Week 1: Psychological Explanation and ‘Levels’ of Description

Core Reading

Cummins, R. 2006: ‘How does it work?’ versus ‘What are the laws?’: Two conceptions of psychological explanation. In Bermúdez (ed.) *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*. London: Routledge, 2006, 90–98.

Recommended Reading

Dennett, D.C. 1978: Artificial intelligence as philosophy and as psychology. In *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 109–26.

Marr, D. 1982: Vision. Reprinted in Bermudez (ed.) *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*.

Additional Reading

- Cummins, R. 1983: *The Nature of Psychological Explanation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
- Davies, M. 2000: Persons and their underpinnings. *Philosophical Explorations*, 3, 43–62.
- Dennett, D.C. 2006: Personal and sub-personal levels of explanation. Reprinted in Bermúdez (ed.) *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*.
- Sterelny, K. 1990: *The Representational Mind*. Chapters 3 and 9.

Week 2: The Computational Theory of Mind: Symbolic Representations and Rules

Core Reading

Crane, T. 2003: *The Mechanical Mind*. Chapter 8.

Recommended Reading

- Fodor, J. 2006: The language of thought: first approximations. Reprinted in Bermúdez (ed.) *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*.
- Sterelny, K. 1990: *The Representational Theory of Mind*. Oxford: Chapter 2.

Additional Reading

- Clark, A. 2013: *Mindware*. Chapters 2-3.
- Churchland, P.S. 1981: Language, thought and information processing. *Nous* 14, 147–70.
- Field, H. 1978: Mental representation. *Erkenntnis*, 13, 34–77.
- Fodor, J. 1987: Why there still has to be a language of thought. In *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Week 3: Modularity of Mind

Core Reading

Fodor, J. 1985: Precis of Modularity of Mind. Reprinted in *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*.

Recommended Reading

- Carruthers, P. 2006: The case for massively modular models of mind. In Stainton (ed.) *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*.
- Prinz, J. 2006: Is the mind really modular? In R. Stainton (ed.) *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Further Reading

- Coltheart, M. 1999: Modularity and cognition. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 3: 115–20.
- Fodor, J. 1983: *The Modularity of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Fodor, J. 2000: *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ch. 3 and 5.
- Machery, E. 2008: Modularity and the flexibility of human cognition. *Mind and Language*, 23: 263–272.

Week 4: Connectionism

Core Reading

Churchland, P.S. and Sejnowski, T.J. 1989: Neural representation and neural computation. In L. Nadel, L. Cooper, P.W. Culicover and R.N. Harnish (eds.) *Neural Connections, Mental Computation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT

Recommended Reading

- Fodor, J. and McLaughlin, B. 1990: Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work. *Cognition* 35: 183–204.
- Smolensky, P. 1988: On the proper treatment of connectionism. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 11, 1–74.

Additional Reading

- Abrahamsen, A. and Bechtel, W. 2006: Phenomena and mechanisms: Putting the symbolic, connectionist, and dynamical systems debate in broader perspective. In Stainton, (ed.) *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*.
- Clark, A. 1990: Connectionism, competence, and explanation. In M. Boden (ed.) *The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 5: Predictive Coding and the Bayesian Brain

Core Reading

- Hohwy, J. 2013: *The Predictive Mind*, Chapters 1-3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Recommended Reading

- Clark, A. 2013: Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future of Cognitive Science. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 36: 181-204.
- Knill, D. and A. Pouget 2004: The Bayesian Brain: the role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation. *Trends in Neuroscience* 27: 712-719.

Additional Reading

- Kverga, K., A. Ghuman, and M. Bar. 2007: Top Down Predictions in the Cognitive Brain. *Brain and Cognition* 65: 145-148.

Week 6: Neuroimaging

Core Reading

- Klein, C. 2010: Philosophical issues in neuroimaging. *Philosophy Compass* 5: 186-198.

Recommended Reading

- Coltheart, M. 2013: How can Functional Neuroimaging Inform Cognitive Theories? *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 8: 98-103.
- Klein, C. 2010: Images are not the evidence in neuroimaging *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 61: 265-278.

Additional Reading

- Roskies, A. 2008: Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance. *Neuroethics* 1: 19-30.

Week 7: Consciousness

Core Reading

- Chalmers, D. 2004: How can we construct a science of consciousness? In M. Gazzaniga (ed.) *The Cognitive Neurosciences III*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Recommended Reading

- Block, N. 2007: Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. *Behavioral and Brain Science* 30: 481-548.
- Goldman, A. 2000: Can science know when you're conscious? Epistemological foundations of

consciousness research. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 7: 3-22.

Additional Reading

Lamme, V. 2006: Towards a true neural stance on consciousness. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 10: 494–501.

Lau, H. 2008: Are we studying consciousness yet? *Frontiers of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press.

Week 8: Social Cognition

Core Reading

Goldman, A.I. 2009: Mirroring, simulating and mindreading. *Mind & Language* 24: 235–52.

Recommended Reading

Gopnik, A. and Wellman, H.M. 1992: Why the child's theory of mind really *is* a theory. *Mind & Language* 7: 145–71.

Davies, M. and Stone, T. 2001: Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. *Philosophical Topics* 29: 127–73.

Additional Reading

Butterfill, S. and Apperly, I. 2013: How to construct a minimal theory of mind. *Mind and Language* 28(5).

Cook, R., Bird, G., Catmur, C., Press, C. & Heyes, C. M. (in press) Mirror neurons: from origin to function. *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*.

Week 9: Implicit Attitudes

Core Reading

Gendler, T. S. 2008: Alief in action (and reaction). *Mind & Language* 23: 552-585.

Recommended Reading

Jost, J. T., Rudman, L. A., Blair, I. V., Carney, D. R., Dasgupta, N., Glaser, J., & Hardin, C. D. 2009: The existence of implicit bias is beyond reasonable doubt: A refutation of ideological and methodological objections and executive summary of ten studies that no manager should ignore. *Research in Organizational Behavior* 29: 39-69.

Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A., Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A., & Mellott, D. S. 2002: A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept. *Psychological Review* 109: 3.

Additional Reading

Gawronski, B., Hofmann, W., & Wilbur, C. J. 2006: Are “implicit” attitudes unconscious? *Consciousness and Cognition* 15: 485-499.

Mandelbaum, E. forthcoming: Attitude, Inference, Association: On the propositional structure of implicit bias. *Nous*.

Week 10: Delusions

Core Reading

Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & McKay, R. 2011: Delusional belief. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 62, 271-298.

Recommended Reading

Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. and Breen, N. 2001: Monothematic delusions: towards a two-factor account. *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology*, 8: 133–58.

Egan, A. Imagination, delusion, and self-deception. In T. Bayne and J. Fernandez (eds.) *Delusions, Self-Deception, and Affective Influences on Belief-formation*. Psychology Press.

Additional Reading

Bortolotti, L. 2009. *Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 1

Ellis, H. D. and Young, A. W. 1990: Accounting for delusional misidentifications. *British Journal of Psychiatry*. 157: 239-248.