

**TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF MENTALITY
(6AANB037) SPRING 2016**

Credits: 15 units

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Consultation Hours: Tuesdays 3-4 pm and Fridays 2-3 pm.

Seminar Hours: Wednesdays 11-1, Room 405 Philosophy Building

COURSE DESCRIPTION

The aim of this course will be to better understand our knowledge of mentality. We have various ways of knowing about the mental states of other people, but, in addition to these, we each seem to have a special way of acquiring self-knowledge of our mental states. In this module, we will explore ordinary self-knowledge and the standard ways in which we know about another person's mental states. In what ways, if any, are these ways of knowing similar? In what ways are they different? What are the prospects for a unified theory of our knowledge of mentality? In addressing these questions, we will consider certain issues in the metaphysics of mind, as well as relevant literature in the cognitive sciences.

READING

The suggested readings for this module are separated into the following two categories:

Core Reading: reading that everyone who wants proper coverage of the subject should read.

Further Reading: additional readings to help further develop your views on a particular subject.

Readings marked with an (*) are available online.

The following texts contain useful collections of essays:

Cassam, Q. (ed.) 1994: *Self-Knowledge*.

Eilan, Naomi, et al. (eds.) 2005: *Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hatzimoysis, A. (ed.) 2008: *Self-Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Macdonald, C., B. Smith, and C. Wright (eds.) 1998: *Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge*. Oxford: OUP.

Smithies, D. and D. Stoljar (eds.), 2012, *Introspection and Consciousness*, Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

PROVISIONAL SCHEDULE

Week 1: An Epistemological Asymmetry

Core Reading

*Gertler, B. 'Self-Knowledge' in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/>)

*Hyslop, A. 'Other Minds' in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/>)

Further Reading

*Boghossian, P. 1989: 'Content and self-knowledge' *Philosophical Topics*: 5-26.

Moran, R. 2001: *Authority and Estrangement*, Ch. 1.

Cassam, Q. 2014: *Self-Knowledge for Humans*, Ch. 1.

*Ryle, G. 1949: *The Concept of Mind*, Ch. 6

Week 2: Self-Knowledge: Introspection

Core Reading

*Gertler, B. 2011: 'Introspecting Phenomenal States' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63: 305–328.

*Horgan, T. and U. Kriegel, 2007: 'Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It So Well?' *Philosophical Issues* 17: 123–144.

*Russell, B., 1917: 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description' in *Mysticism and Logic*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Further reading

*Snowdon, P. 2012: 'How to Think about Phenomenal Self-Knowledge' in A. Coliva, *The Self and Self-Knowledge*, Oxford University Press.

*Smithies, D. 2012: 'A Simple Theory of Introspection' in Smithies and Stoljar 2012: 259–294.

Week 3: Self-Knowledge: Constitutive Theories

Core Reading

*Heal, J. 2001: On first-person authority *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*.

*Shoemaker, S. 2009: 'Self-Intimation and Second-Order Belief' *Erkenntnis* 71: 35-51.

Further reading

*Coliva, A. 2012: 'One Variety of Self-Knowledge: Constitutivism as Constructivism' in A. Coliva, *The Self and Self-Knowledge*, Oxford University Press.

*Srinivasan, A. 2015: 'Are We Luminous?' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 90.

Week 4: Self-Knowledge: Expressivism

Core Reading

*Bar-On, D. and D. C. Long 2001: 'Avowals and first-person privilege' *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research*: 311-335.

*Bar-On, D. 2009: 'First-person authority: dualism, constitutivism, and neo-expressivism' *Erkenntnis* 71.1: 53-71.

Further reading

*Bar-On, D. 2004: *Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge: Expression and Self-Knowledge*. Oxford University Press.

Finkelstein, D. 2003: *Expression and the Inner*. Harvard University Press.

*Parrott, M. 2015: 'Expressing First-Person Authority' *Philosophical Studies* 172 (8):2215-2237.

Week 5: Self-Knowledge: Transparency

Core Reading

*Boyle, M. 2011: 'Transparent Self-Knowledge' *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 85: 223-241.

*Byrne, A. 2005: 'Introspection' *Philosophical Topics* 33(1): 79-104.

Further reading

Moran, R. 2001: *Authority and Estrangement*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

*Moran, R. 2012: 'Self-Knowledge, "Transparency", and the Forms of Activity.' In Smithies and Stoljar.

*Cassam, Q. 2011: 'Knowing What You Believe' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 111: 1-23.

*Paul, S. 2014: 'The Transparency of Mind' *Philosophy Compass* 9 (5): 295-303.

Week 6: Self-Knowledge: Skepticism

Core Reading

*Schwitzgebel, E. 2008: 'The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection' *Philosophical Review* 117: 245-273.

*Nisbett, R. and T. Wilson 1977: 'Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes' *Psychological Review* 84: 231-259.

Further reading

*Wilson, T. and E.W. Dunn 2004: 'Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement' *Annual Review of Psychology* 55: 493-518.

*Spener, M. 2013: 'Moderate Scepticism About Introspection' *Philosophical Studies* 165: 1187-1194.

Week 7: Other Minds: Inference

Core reading

*Robert Pargetter 1984: 'The Scientific Inference to Other Minds'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 62:158-63.

*Hyslop, A. and Jackson, F. 1972: 'The Analogical Inference to Other Minds' *American Philosophical Quarterly* 9: 168-176.

Further reading

- *Gomes, A. forthcoming: 'Skepticism About Other Minds.' In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.) *Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present*. Bloomsbury.
- *McNeill, W. 2015: 'Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others' Minds'. *Philosophical Studies* 172:1435-1454.
- Avramides, A. 2010: 'Knowledge of Other Minds'. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) *Routledge Companion to Epistemology*. New York: Routledge.

Week 8: Other Minds: Perception

Core Reading

- *Dretske, F 1973: 'Perception and Other Minds'. *Noûs* 7: 34-44.
- *Smith, J. 2013: 'The Phenomenology of Face-to-Face Mindreading'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 87: 274-293.

Further reading

- *Cassam, Q. 2009: *The Possibility of Knowledge*, Ch. 5
- *McDowell, J. 1982: 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge'. *Proceedings of the British Academy* 68: 455-79.
- *McNeill, W 2012: 'On Seeing That Someone is Angry'. *European Journal of Philosophy* 20: 575-597.
- *Parrott, M. (forthcoming): The Look of Another Mind. *Mind*.
- *Spaulding, S. (forthcoming): On Direct Social Perception. *Consciousness and Cognition*.

Week 9: Other Minds: Lessons from Experimental Psychology

Core reading

- *Goldman, A. 2009: 'Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading'. *Mind and Language* 24 (2):235-252.
- *Heyes, C. 2014: 'Submentalizing: I'm not really reading your mind'. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 9, 131-143

Further Reading

- *Apperly, I. and S. Butterfill 2013: 'How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind'. *Mind and Language* 28 (5): 606-637.
- *Borg, E. 2007: 'If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question?' *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 14: 5-19.
- *Cook, R., Bird, G., Catmur, C., Press, C. & Heyes, C. M. 2014: 'Mirror neurons: from origin to function'. *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 37, 177-241.
- *Spaulding, S. 2013: 'Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition'. *Mind and Language* 28 (2):233-257.

Week 10: Other Minds and Irreducible Knowledge

Core reading

- *Gomes, A. 2015: Testimony and Other Minds. *Erkenntnis* 80:173-183.

*Austin, J.L. 1946: Other Minds. *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 20:148-87.

Further reading

*Heal, J. 2014: 'Second Person Thought' *Philosophical Explorations* 17: 317-331.

*Malcolm, N. 1958: 'Knowledge of Other Minds'. *Journal of Philosophy* 55 (September):35-52.