
 PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY – READING LIST

The readings for the course are separated into the following categories:

Core Reading: reading that everyone who wants proper coverage of the subject must read.

Recommended Reading: readings that are strongly recommended to help you further develop your views on a particular subject.

Additional Reading: useful background readings for anyone interested in further exploring a topic.

Module texts:

The following are very good introductory texts for anyone seeking background in philosophy of psychology:

A. Clark: *MindWare*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

T. Crane: *The Elements of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

K. Sterelny: *The Representational Mind*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Weekly Reading Schedule

Week 1: Psychological Explanation and ‘Levels’ of Description

Core Reading

Cummins, R. 2006: ‘How does it work?’ versus ‘What are the laws?’: Two conceptions of psychological explanation. In Bermúdez (ed.) *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*. London: Routledge, 2006, 90–98.

Recommended Reading

Block, N. 1995: The Mind as the Software of the Brain. In D. Osherson et. al. *An Invitation to Cognitive Science*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dennett, D.C. 1978: Artificial intelligence as philosophy and as psychology. In *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 109–26.

Additional Reading

Cummins, R. 1983: *The Nature of Psychological Explanation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

Davies, M. 2000: Persons and their underpinnings. *Philosophical Explorations*, 3, 43–62.

Dennett, D.C. 2006: Personal and sub-personal levels of explanation. Reprinted in Bermúdez (ed.) *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*.

Sterelny, K. 1990: *The Representational Mind*. Chapters 3 and 9.

Week 2: The Computational Theory of Mind: Symbolic Representations and Rules*Core Reading*

Crane, T. 2003: *The Mechanical Mind*. Chapters 7-8.

Marr, D. 1982: Vision. Reprinted in Bermudez (ed.) *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*.

Recommended Reading

Fodor, J. 2006: The language of thought: first approximations. Reprinted in Bermúdez (ed.) *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*.

Fodor, J. 1987: Why there still has to be a language of thought. In *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Additional Reading

Clark, A. 2013: *Mindware*. Chapters 2-3.

Churchland, P.S. 1981: Language, thought and information processing. *Nous* 14, 147–70.

Field, H. 1978: Mental representation. *Erkenntnis*, 13, 34–77.

Week 3: Modularity of Mind*Core Reading*

Fodor, J. 1985: Precis of Modularity of Mind. Reprinted in *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*.

Recommended Reading

Coltheart, M. 1999: Modularity and cognition. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 3: 115–20.

Fodor, J. 1983: *The Modularity of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Fodor, J. 2000: *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ch. 3 and 5.

Machery, E. 2008: Modularity and the flexibility of human cognition. *Mind and Language*, 23: 263–272.

Further Reading

Carruthers, P. 2006: The case for massively modular models of mind. In Stainton (ed.) *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*.

Prinz, J. 2006: Is the mind really modular? In R. Stainton (ed.) *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Week 4: Connectionism and Neural Networks*Core Reading*

Churchland, P.S. and Sejnowski, T.J. 1989: Neural representation and neural computation. In L. Nadel, L. Cooper, P.W. Culicover and R.N. Harnish (eds.) *Neural Connections, Mental Computation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT

Recommended Reading

Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z. 1988: 'Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.' *Cognition* 28.1-2: 3-71.

Sterelny, K. *The Representational Mind*, Chapter 8.

Additional Reading

Smolensky, P. 1988: On the proper treatment of connectionism. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 11, 1-74.

Fodor, J. and McLaughlin, B. 1990: Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work. *Cognition* 35: 183-204.

Clark, A. 1990: Connectionism, competence, and explanation. In M. Boden (ed.) *The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 5: Predictive Coding and the Bayesian Brain*Core Reading*

Clark, A. 2013: Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future of Cognitive Science. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 36: 181-204.

Recommended Reading

Hohwy, J. 2013: *The Predictive Mind*, Chapters 1-4. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knill, D. and A. Pouget 2004: The Bayesian Brain: the role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation. *Trends in Neuroscience* 27: 712-719.

Additional Reading

Griffiths, T.L., Kemp, C., Tenenbaum, J.B. 2008: Bayesian models of cognition, *Cambridge Handbook of Computational Cognitive Modelling*.

Kverga, K., A. Ghuman, and M. Bar. 2007: Top Down Predictions in the Cognitive Brain. *Brain and Cognition* 65: 145-148.

Week 6: Consciousness*Core Reading*

Chalmers, D. 2004: How can we construct a science of consciousness? In M. Gazzaniga (ed.) *The Cognitive Neurosciences III*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Recommended Reading

Block, N. 2007: Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. *Behavioral and Brain Science* 30: 481-548.

Goldman, A. 2000: Can science know when you're conscious? Epistemological foundations of consciousness research. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 7: 3-22.

Additional Reading

- Lamme, V. 2006: Towards a true neural stance on consciousness. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 10: 494–501.
- Lau, H. 2008: Are we studying consciousness yet? *Frontiers of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press.

Week 7: Social Cognition/Mindreading*Core Reading*

- Stich, S. and Nichols, S. 1992: Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? *Mind and Language* 7: 35-71.

Recommended Reading

- Gopnik, A. and Wellman, H.M. 1992: Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. *Mind & Language* 7: 145–71.
- Goldman, A.I. 2009: Mirroring, simulating and mindreading. *Mind & Language* 24: 235–52.
- Davies, M. and Stone, T. 2001: Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. *Philosophical Topics* 29: 127–73.

Additional Reading

- Butterfill, S. and Apperly, I. 2013: How to construct a minimal theory of mind. *Mind and Language* 28(5).
- Cook, R., Bird, G., Catmur, C., Press, C. & Heyes, C. M. (in press) Mirror neurons: from origin to function. *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*.

Week 8: Moral Psychology

- Haidt, J. 2001: The emotional dog and its rationalist tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. *Psychological Review* 108: 814-834.

Recommended Reading

- Greene, J., et al. 2004: "The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. *Neuron* 44.2: 389-400.
- Greene, J. and Haidt J. 2002: How (and where) does moral judgment work?. *Trends in cognitive sciences* 6.12: 517-523.

Additional Reading

- Doris, J. and Stich, S. 2005: As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics. In F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Knobe, J. 2006: The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology. *Philosophical Studies* 130: 202-231.
- Paxton, J. and Greene, J. 2010: Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations. *Topics in Cognitive Science* 2: 511-527.

Week 9: Implicit Attitudes*Core Reading*

Gendler, T. S. 2008: Alief in action (and reaction). *Mind & Language* 23: 552-585.

Recommended Reading

- Jost, J. T., Rudman, L. A., Blair, I. V., Carney, D. R., Dasgupta, N., Glaser, J., & Hardin, C. D. 2009: The existence of implicit bias is beyond reasonable doubt: A refutation of ideological and methodological objections and executive summary of ten studies that no manager should ignore. *Research in Organizational Behavior* 29: 39-69.
- Greenwald A. and Banaji, M. 1995: Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes. *Psychological Review* 102 (1): 4-27.

Additional Reading

- Gawronski, B., Hofmann, W., & Wilbur, C. J. 2006: Are “implicit” attitudes unconscious? *Consciousness and Cognition* 15: 485-499.
- Mandelbaum, E. forthcoming: Attitude, Inference, Association: On the propositional structure of implicit bias. *Nous*.

Week 10: Delusions

Core Reading

- Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & McKay, R. 2011: Delusional belief. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 62, 271-298.

Recommended Reading

- Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. and Breen, N. 2001: Monothematic delusions: towards a two-factor account. *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology*, 8: 133–58.
- Egan, A. Imagination, delusion, and self-deception. In T. Bayne and J. Fernandez (eds.) *Delusions, Self-Deception, and Affective Influences on Belief-formation*. Psychology Press.

Additional Reading

- Bortolotti, L. 2009. *Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 1
- Ellis, H. D. and Young, A. W. 1990: Accounting for delusional misidentifications. *British Journal of Psychiatry*. 157: 239-248.